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Abstract
Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game-theoretic
results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics
in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e. the existence of a
winning strategy in games that involve two players and two outcomes saying who wins.
In a multi-outcome setting, the notion of winning strategy is irrelevant yet usually
replaced faithfully with the notion of (pure) Nash equilibrium. This article shows that
every determinacy result over an arbitrary game structure, e.g. a tree, is transferable
into existence of multi-outcome (pure) Nash equilibrium over the same game structure.
The equilibrium-transfer theorem requires cardinal or order-theoretic conditions on
the strategy sets and the preferences, respectively, whereas counter-examples show
that every requirement is relevant, albeit possibly improvable. When the outcomes
are finitely many, the proof provides an algorithm computing a Nash equilibrium
without significant complexity loss compared to the two-outcome case. As examples
of application, this article generalises Borel determinacy, positional determinacy of
parity games, and finite-memory determinacy of Muller games.
Keywords: Determinacy, Borel, parity games, Muller games, transfer from determinacy
to multi-outcome Nash equilibrium
1 Introduction
Game theory is the theory of competitive interactions between decision makers having dif-
ferent interests. Its primary purpose is to further understand such real-world interactions
through mathematical modelling, so it usually studies games that involve many players
and many possible outcomes, which are meant to describe faithfully the many shades of
situations involving many stakeholders. Apart from some earlier related works, the field
of game theory is usually said to be born in the first part of the 20th century, especially
thanks to von Neumann [12], but also Borel [1] and some others. Since then, it has been
applied to many concrete areas such as economics, political science, evolutionary biology,
computer science, etc. Conversely, specific problems in these concrete areas have been
triggering new general questions and have thus been helpful in developing game theory.
Surprisingly, game theory has also provided useful point of view and terminology to
abstract areas such as logic, descriptive set theory, and theoretical informatics. For in-
stance, Martin [9] describes the (quasi-)Borel sets via the guaranteed existence of winning
strategies in some games that are built using these (quasi-)Borel sets. More specifically,
1
these games involve only two players and two outcomes saying who wins, i.e. they are
win-lose games, and they are built on infinite trees. Similarly, [2], [5],[3], [11], etc, relate
some statements about logic to the existence/computation of simple winning strategies in
some two-player win-lose games that are built on finite graphs, namely Muller games and
parity games. In such frameworks, existence of a winning strategy (of some sort) is called
determinacy, and the games that enjoy it are said to be determined.
There are substantial differences between the two above-mentioned types of game
theory: games for logic are simple in terms of players, outcomes, and preferences, but the
underlying structures are complex (since they pertain to the objects under study), whereas
it is the other way round with games for economics, where the underlying structures
involve, e.g., finiteness and continuous functions. Of course one would wish to get the
best of the two worlds and to understand multi-player, multi-outcome games that are
built on complex structures.
The above wish may partly come true. Indeed for some games of specific structures,
determinacy results have already been generalised by considering the same structures
for many player, many outcomes and the usual generalisation of the notion of winning
strategy, namely the notion of Nash equilibrium: for instance, quasi-Borel determinacy was
generalised in [14] for (infinitely) many players and (infinitely) many outcomes; similarly,
finite-memory determinacy of Muller games was generalised in [13]; and a similar question
was asked in [15] for parity games. Said otherwise, for specific structures such as infinite
trees or finite graphs, existence of winning strategies for all two-player win-lose games that
are built on these structures might be transferred, through ad-hoc proofs, into existence
of Nash equilibrium for all multi-player multi-outcome games that are built on these same
structures.
This article shows through a single, uniform proof that such a transfer of equilibrium
from win-lose to multi-outcome setting holds irrespective of the structure of the game,
i.e. it need not be a tree, or a graph, etc. However, a universal equilibrium-transfer
theorem seems to hold for two-player games only, and to fail for three players already,
although a clear-cut general counterexample is still missing. Furthermore, the general
order-theoretic condition of the theorem, i.e. that the preference orders over the outcomes
be of (uniformly) finite height, can be relaxed to ”inverted” well-foundness when strategy
sets are countable. The case in between, where only one strategy set is countable and the
inverse relation of preferences are well-founded yet with chains of arbitrary length, is still
open.
Note that the Nash equilibria that are considered in this article are all pure since the
concept need not be weakened through probabilistic means.
Section 1.1 introduces the main result of this article intuitively, using an example; Sec-
tion 1.2 defines the required concepts and makes two straightforward remarks; Section 1.3
states the main result of this article, i.e. the equilibrium-transfer theorem, and provides
a proof in a very simple yet informative case. Section 2 presents the equilibrium-transfer
theorem and details the algorithmic content of the proof when the outcomes are finitely
many; Section 3 invokes the equilibrium-transfer theorem to generalise Martin’s theorem
on Borel determinacy, positional determinacy of parity games (with infinitely many prior-
ities), and finite-memory determinacy of Muller games; Section 4 gives counterexamples
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to reasonable candidates to generalise the theorem; and Section 5 concludes and shows
in passing that, generally speaking in game theory, linearly ordered preferences do not
account for partially ordered preferences.
1.1 From simple example to general idea
Let us exemplify what the main result of this article, i.e. the equilibrium-transfer theorem,
can actually do. A finite real-valued two-player game in extensive form is an object built
on a finite rooted tree; each internal node is owned by exactly one player, and each leaf
encloses a real-valued payoff function, i.e. an ordered pair assigning one real number to
each player. The leftmost two objects below are such games, the second game being even
a win-lose game. Intuitively, the left-most game is played as follows: player b at the root
chooses left or right. Right yields payoff 1 for a and 0 for b, left requires a choice from
player a, and so on until a leaf is reached.
b
a
b
4, 2 1, 0
3, 3
1, 0
b
a
b
1, 0 0, 1
1, 0
0, 1
b
a
b
4, 2 1, 0
3, 3
1, 0
b
a
b
1, 0 0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
b
a
b
X Y
Z
Y
A strategy profile is an ordered pair enclosing one strategy per player, where a strategy
of a player is a complete collection of the (unique) choices that the player would make
at each node (MODIFY that he/she owns) if the play ever reached this node. The third
(resp. fourth) object from the left above represents a strategy profile for the first (resp.
second) game, where the double lines represent the strategical choices. A strategy profile
induces one unique payoff function, by following the unique choices from the root to the
leaves. When assumed that the players prefer greater payoffs for themselves, the third
object above is not a Nash equilibrium, because at least one of the player, namely b,
can improve upon his/her payoff by changing his/her strategy from ”right-right” to ”left-
left” and obtain 2 instead of 0. The fourth object above is a Nash equilibrium because
no player can improve upon what they already have. Said otherwise, ”right-right” is a
winning strategy for player b.
The rightmost object above, with variables X, Y and Z, is an abstraction of the
leftmost game: it represents the structure of the game. Especially, repetition of the
variable Y captures equality between payoff functions in the original game. There are 23
possibilities to instantiate the variables of the game structure with (1, 0) and (0, 1), one of
them being the second game above. There are infinitely many possibilities to instantiate
the variables of the game structure with real-valued payoff functions, one of them being
the leftmost game above. The two strategy profiles above suggest that there are many
more Nash equilibria in win-lose games than in games with real-valued payoff functions.
This is actually true, but since all the 23 win-lose games that are derived from the game
structure above have a Nash equilibrium (equivalently, a winning strategy), which is easy
to check, the equilibrium-transfer theorem, stated in Section 1.3, implies that all the games
with real-valued payoff functions that are derived from the same game structure also have
a Nash equilibrium, which is more difficult to check! (Albeit already proved in [6].)
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In the same way, the equilibrium-transfer theorem turns essentially all determinacy
results into existence of Nash equilibrium in a two-player, multi-outcome setting. It is
applied to Borel determinacy, finite-memory determinacy of Muller game, and positional
determinacy of parity games in Section 3. Apart from the generalisation of positional
determinacy of parity games, which is new, the two other obtained results are weaker
than existing results; but the key point here, however, is that the three applications are
almost effortless, and that the same would hold for further applications.
The equilibrium-transfer theorem relates to all two-player win-lose games where the
notion of winning strategy makes sense, namely strategy-based games. Since on the one
hand, all strategy-based games are faithfully embeddable into games in normal form, as
far as existence of Nash equilibrium is concerned, and since on the other hand, games
with abstract outcomes and preferences are much more general than real-valued games,
the theorem will be stated for abstract games in normal form.
1.2 Definitions
Unlike traditional games in normal form, the definition below involves abstract outcomes
(instead of mere real-valued payoff functions) and preferences that are arbitrary (instead
of transitive, reflexive, total, etc.). It is important since there is no reason why games,
e.g., with real-valued payoff functions should account for all possible games. For instance,
Section 5 defines a simple preference that has a game-theoretic property relating to Nash
equilibrium but whose every linear extension fails to have the same game-theoretic prop-
erty.
Definition 1 (Games in normal form) They are tuples 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 sat-
isfying the following:
• A is a non-empty set (of players, or agents),
•
∏
a∈A Sa is a non-empty Cartesian product (whose elements are the strategy profiles
and where Sa represents the strategies available to player a),
• O is a non-empty set (of possible outcomes),
• v :
∏
a∈A Sa → O (the outcome function that values the strategy profiles),
• Each ≺a is a binary relation over O (modelling the preference of player a).
The traditional notion of Nash equilibrium is rephrased below in the abstract setting
with a subtle semantic change (but remains the same in extension): each binary relation
≺a, which I call preference, is the complement of the inverse of what is traditionally called
preference.
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium) Let g = 〈A, (Sa)a∈A, O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game in
normal form. A strategy profile s in S :=
∏
a∈A Sa is a Nash equilibrium if it makes
every player a stable, i.e. v(s) 6≺a v(s′) for all s′ ∈ S that differ from s at most at the
a-component.
NE(s) := ∀a ∈ A,∀s′ ∈ S, ¬(v(s) ≺a v(s
′) ∧ ∀b ∈ A− {a}, sb = s
′
b)
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Three games in normal form are represented below as arrays. They all involve two
players, say a and b, two strategies for a (resp. b), namely al and ar (resp. bl and br),
and outcomes in R2. In this specific case, an outcome is usually called a payoff function
because it assigns one payoff to every player. Player a (resp. b) prefers payoff functions
with greater first (resp. second) component. In the first game, if player a picks the strategy
al and player b picks bl, the strategy profile (al, bl) then yields payoff 1 for a and 0 for b.
This profile is not a Nash equilibrium because, by changing strategies, player a can convert
the profile (al, bl) into (ar, bl) and obtain payoff 2, which is greater than 1. The game has
two Nash equilibria, namely profiles (ar, bl) and (al, br). The second game has no Nash
equilibrium and the third game, which enjoys some symmetry, has two Nash equilibria.
These last two games suggest that the notion of Nash equilibrium cannot, at least directly,
and even by using probabilities, lead to a notion of best move, i.e. of recommendations
on how to play.
bl br
al 1, 0 5, 0
ar 2, 4 5, 3
bl br
al 0, 1 1, 0
ar 1, 0 0, 1
bl br
al 2, 1 0, 0
ar 0, 0 1, 2
The two-player win-lose games in normal form, defined below, are special cases of
games in normal form.
Definition 3 (Win-lose games in normal form, winning strategies, and determinacy) •
A win-lose game is a game where A = {1, 2} and O = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and the pref-
erences are defined by (0, 1) ≺1 (1, 0) and (1, 0) ≺2 (0, 1), so all these usually may
remain implicit.
• A winning strategy for player 1 is a strategy s1 ∈ S1 such that v(s1, s2) = (1, 0)
for all s2 ∈ S2. A winning strategy for player 2 is a strategy s2 ∈ S2 such that
v(s1, s2) = (0, 1) for all s1 ∈ S1.
• A win-lose game such that one player has a winning strategy is said to be determined.
Three win-lose games are represented below. For the first game, player a has the
winning strategy ar; for the second game, player b has the winning strategy br; there is
no winning strategy for the third game.
bl br
al 0, 1 0, 1
ar 1, 0 1, 0
bl br
al 1, 0 0, 1
ar 1, 0 0, 1
bl br
al 0, 1 1, 0
ar 1, 0 0, 1
The notion of winning strategy is relevant in win-lose games only, but the following
remark clarifies why the transfer from winning strategy to multi-outcome Nash equilibrium
is a process of generalisation.
Remark 4 A win-lose game has a winning strategies iff it has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof On the one hand, the strategy profile made of a winning strategy of a player
and any strategy of his or her opponent constitutes a Nash equilibrium; conversely, the
X-component of a Nash equilibrium where player X wins is a winning strategy for X. 
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Section 1.1 has already exemplified that both win-lose games and abstract games can
be derived from a game structure. This is formalised below.
Definition 5 (Induced structures, derived games, determined structures, enforcement)
Let 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 be a two-player game.
• 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v〉 is the structure induced by the game, and conversely, the game
is said to be derived from the structure.
• Let wl be a function from O to {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, the win-lose game 〈S1, S2, wl ◦ v〉 is
also said to be derived from the structure.
• Let R1 ⊆ S1 and R2 ⊆ S2. If all win-lose games derived from a structure are
determined (via strategies in R1 or R2), the structure is also said to be determined
(via strategies in R1 or R2).
• Let 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v〉 be a game structure, let P ⊆ O, and let s1 ∈ S1 such that
v(s1, S2) := {v(s1, s2) | s2 ∈ S2} ⊆ P . The strategy s1 is said to enforce P and
exclude O\P .
The subsets Ri from Definition 5 represent strategies of special interest. For instance,
as already mentioned, Muller games are determined through strategies that can be de-
scribed by finite automata, and parity games are determined through strategies that are
called positional.
The leftmost game structure below is not determined, e.g., because instantiating X
with (1, 0) and Y with (0, 1) yields a game without Nash equilibrium, or equivalently
without winning strategy. The other two game structures are determined. (To see this for
the rightmost one, it suffices to make a case distinction on how Y is instantiated.)
bl br
al X Y
ar Y X
bl br
al X Z
ar Y Y
bl bm br
al X Z Y
ar Y Y Y
The following remark holds since deriving a win-lose game from a structure amounts
to choosing the characteristic function of a subset of the outcomes.
Remark 6 A game structure is determined iff each subset of the outcomes can be either
enforced by player 1 or excluded by player 2.
1.3 Main result and proof in the simplest case
Put simply, the equilibrium-transfer theorem reads as follows: if a game structure is deter-
mined through nice strategies, all (reasonable) abstract games derived from the structure
have a nice Nash equilibrium; and the converse is of course true! (In the sequel, if ≺ is a
binary relation, its inverse is defined by x ≺−1 y iff y ≺ x.)
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Theorem 7 (Equilibrium transfer) Let 〈{1, 2}, S1 , S2, O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 be a two-player
game whose induced structure is determined through strategies in R1 ⊆ S1 and R2 ⊆ S2,
and assume either of the following conditions:
1. the preferences ≺1 (resp. ≺2) has (uniformly) finite height,
i.e. there is n ∈ N such that there is no o0 ≺1 o1 ≺1 · · · ≺1 on (resp. o0 ≺2 o1 ≺2
· · · ≺2 on).
2. the strategy sets S1 and S2 are countable and ≺
−1
1
and ≺−1
2
are well-founded,
i.e. there is no infinite ascending sequence o0 ≺1 o1 ≺1 . . . (resp. o0 ≺2 o1 ≺2 . . . )
Then 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 has a Nash equilibrium in R1 ×R2.
Following up on Section 1.1: to prove that all finite real-valued two-player games in
extensive form have a Nash equilibrium, it suffices, firstly, to show that the structures
induced by these games are determined, secondly, to argue that the preferences of each
given real-valued game have finite height (since they are acyclic and the game involves only
finitely many payoff functions), and finally, to invoke the equilibrium-transfer theorem.
Note that theses games are not derived from the same game structure, but rather from
infinitely many structures.
The equilibrium-transfer theorem should be of interest to both game theorists and
mathematicians dealing with games. To game theorists, it provides an economical way
of proving existence of multi-outcome Nash equilibrium for all games in a class that is
derived from a set of two-player game structures; to mathematicians, it provides an easy
way to generalise their determinacy results, which are dedicated to logic in the first place,
and thus advertise their work to game theorists.
Proposition 8 below is a very simple version of the equilibrium-transfer theorem, but
the very basic idea is already there. It uses only an abstraction of zero-sum games, i.e.
two-player games where the two preference relations are inverses of each other. It is
named after von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem (see, e.g., [12]) to hint at the similarities,
although it is neither a generalisation nor a special case of it. (For instance, the Minimax
Theorem involves infinitely many mixed strategies whereas Proposition 8 involves finitely
many pure strategies only.)
Proposition 8 (Minimax transfer) Let 〈{1, 2}, S1 , S2, O, v, {<1, <
−1
1
}〉 be a two-player
game in normal form whose induced structure is determined, and assume that <1 is a strict
linear order over the finite domain O. Then the game has a Nash equilibrium (and all
Nash equilibria yield the same outcome).
Proof Let P be the smallest (for inclusion) <1-terminal interval (i.e. x ∈ P ∧x <1 y ⇒
y ∈ P ) that player 1 can enforce via some strategy s1, and let m be the <1-minimum (and
the <−1
1
-maximum!) of P . Since player 1 cannot enforce P − {m}, by remark 6 player 2
can enforce (O\P ) ∪ {m} via some strategy s2. Therefore (s1, s2) is a Nash equilibrium
yielding outcome m, and any strategy profile that does not yield m may be improved upon
by one player i via si. 
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All the conditions of application of Theorem 7 are important, as mentioned below
and further detailed in Section 4. First, when the inverse of some preference is not well-
founded, it is easy to build a (one-player) game without Nash equilibrium. Second, this
article defines a two-player game without Nash equilibrium although its induced game
structure is determined, while the strategies of one player only are countably many, one
preference only has finite height, and the inverse of the other preference is still well-
founded. Third, a natural three-player version of the equilibrium-transfer theorem may
sound as follows: ”given a three-player game with preferences of finite height, if replacing
the actual preferences by preferences of smaller height always yields a game with a Nash
equilibrium, and/or if merging two players (into a super-player) or slicing the induced
structure (i.e fixing one player’s strategy) always yields a determined structure, then the
given three-player game has a Nash equilibrium.” Counter-examples show that simpler
versions of the statement above do not hold, but the general case is still open.
2 The equilibrium-transfer theorem
This section proves the theorem by transfinite induction on the preferences. The three
main ingredients of the proof are: an equilibrium-reflecting reduction that shrinks games
in terms of preferences, a property on functions from N2 to N that enables a diagonal
argument when shrinking games is not possible, and a finite-case version of the theorem,
which itself relies on lifting binary relations to the power set of their domains. This lift,
defined below, is the key idea of the equilibrium transfer: especially, it overcomes the
difficulty that the proof of the minimax transfer does not scale up for preferences that
are not inverses of each other. Note that a simpler and sufficient (to prove equilibrium
transfer) version of the lift is mentioned in Remark 11 afterwards.
Definition 9 A binary relation ≺ on a set S may be lifted to the power set of S as below.
∀A,B ⊆ S, A ≺P B := ∃a ∈ A\B,∀b ∈ B\A, a ≺ b
Lemma 10 Let ≺ be a binary relation on a set S. If ≺ is a strict linear order, ≺P is a
strict partial order.
Proof A strict partial order is a transitive and irreflexive binary relation. A strict
linear order is a strict partial order such that any two distinct elements are comparable.
Assume that ≺ is as strict linear order. Since ≺P is irreflexive by definition, it suffices to
show that ≺P is transitive. Assume that A ≺P B and B ≺P C with respective witnesses
a ∈ A\B and b ∈ B\C. First note that a 6= b since a /∈ B and b ∈ B. Now let us case-split
to show that A ≺P C.
• Assume that a ≺ b, so ¬(b ≺ a) by transitivity and irreflexivity assumptions, so
a /∈ C\B since b is a witness for B ≺P C. Together with a /∈ B it yields a /∈ C, so
a ∈ A\C. Now let x be in C\A. If x ∈ B, then x ∈ B\A, and a ≺ x since a is a
witness for A ≺P B. If x /∈ B, then x ∈ C\B, and b ≺ x since b is a witness for
B ≺P C, so a ≺ x by transitivity. Therefore A ≺P C is witnessed by a.
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• Assume that b ≺ a, so ¬(a ≺ b) by transitivity and irreflexivity assumptions, so
b /∈ B\A since a is a witness for A ≺P B. Together with b ∈ B it yields b ∈ A, so
b ∈ A\C. Now let x be in C\A. If x /∈ B, then x ∈ C\B, and b ≺ x since b is a
witness for B ≺P C. If x ∈ B, then x ∈ B\A, and a ≺ x since a is a witness for
A ≺P B, so b ≺ x by transitivity. Therefore A ≺P C is witnessed by b.

Remark 11 For finite linear order, Definition 9 can be rephrased as A <P B := A 6=
B ∧ min<(A\B ∪ B\A) ∈ A, and Lemma 10 can be strengthen into ”<P is also a strict
linear order”. This <P is isomorphic to the lexicographic order induced by < on the
characteristic functions of the complements of the subsets. For example let o1 < o2 < o3 <
o4 < o5, then {o2, o3, o4, o5} <P {o2, o4} corresponds to 10000 <lex 10101.
The lemma below states a bit more than a mere finitely-many-outcome version of
the forthcoming theorem; it sounds a bit less natural too, due to Condition 3 (which is
obviously fulfilled when the outcomes are finitely many), but it is very useful in the proof of
the equilibrium-transfer theorem. In the statement of the lemma, ≺∗i denotes the reflexive
and transitive closure of ≺i.
Lemma 12 (Finitary equilibrium transfer) Let 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 be a
two-player game in normal form, let R1 ⊆ S1 and R2 ⊆ S2, and let us assume the
following:
1. the game structure is determined via strategies in R1 and R2.
2. both preferences ≺1 and ≺2 are acyclic.
3. ∃s1 ∈ S1, |{o ∈ O | ∃s2 ∈ S2, v(s1, s2) ≺∗1 o}| <∞ ∨
∃s2 ∈ S2, |{o ∈ O | ∃s1 ∈ S1, v(s1, s2) ≺∗2 o}| <∞
That is, one player i can enforce a subset of outcomes whose ≺i-upward-generated
cone is finite.
Then the game 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 has a Nash equilibrium in R1 ×R2.
Proof First note that if player i can enforce a subset of outcome (via some strategy in
Si), he or she can enforce it via some strategy in Ri, since the opponent cannot exclude
it and by determinacy assumption together with Remark 6. Assume that, e.g., player 1
can enforce a finite ≺1-upward-generated cone C. Since ≺1 is acyclic, so is its restriction
≺1|C to C; let < be a strict linear extension of ≺1|C , so <P is a strict linear order too,
by Remark 11. Let M be the <P-greatest subset of C that player 1 can enforce and let
s1 ∈ R1 be a strategy enforcing M .
Since M is finite and non-empty and since ≺2 is acyclic, let m be ≺2|M -maximal and
let X := {x ∈ M | x < m} ∪ {x ∈ C | m < x}. Since M <P X by Remark 11 (or by
Definition 9), and since X ⊆ C by definition of M and X, player 1 cannot enforce X by
definition of M , so player 2 can enforce O\X by determinacy assumption and Remark 6.
Let s2 ∈ R2 be a strategy enforcing O\X, so that v(s1, s2) ∈M ∩ (O\X) = {m}.
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First, the strategy profile (s1, s2) makes Player 2 stable, since m is ≺2-maximal among
M , which is enforced by s1. Second, let o ∈ O be such that m ≺1 o, so o ∈ C by definition
of C, so o ∈ X by definition of < and X, so m is ≺1-maximal among O\X, which is
enforced by s2. Therefore (s1, s2) ∈ R1 ×R2 is a Nash equilibrium. 
There is a straightforward algorithmic consequence of the proof of Lemma 12. Namely,
finding a suitable Nash equilibrium in a two-player game that involves n outcomes requires
at most n (resp. 2) calls to the function expecting a win-lose game and returning the
winning player (resp. a suitable winning strategy). To justify this, let us fix a game
〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, {o1, . . . , on}, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 and let < be a linear extension of ≺1 and assume
that o1 < · · · < on up to renaming. Let us represent every subset O′ of {o1, . . . , on} via
a characteristic word u over {0, 1} (which may be seen as characteristic functions), where
ui = 1 iff oi ∈ O′. For all u ∈ {0, 1}n let wa(u) be the winner of the derived win-lose
game 〈S1, S2, u ◦ v〉 (see Definition 3) and ws(u) ∈ R1 ⊔ R2 be a winning strategy for
the winner. When called with the arguments (n, ǫ), the function g defined below returns
within n recursive calls the characteristic word of the <-maximum subset that player 1
can enforce, where each recursive step calls wa only once.
• g(0, u) := u
• g(k + 1, u) := g(k, u · b) where b := 0 if wa(u · 0 · 1k) = 1 and b := 1 otherwise.
Now let oj be ≺2-maximal in the set represented by g(n, ǫ). The strategy profile
(ws ◦ g(n, ǫ), ws(g(n, ǫ)<j · 0 · 1n−j) is the Nash equilibrium from the proof of Lemma 12.
When considering infinitely many outcomes, there may not exist a maximal subset that
a given player can enforce. Nonetheless, the lemma above and the following two lemmas
will be combined to prove the theorem by transfinite induction on (the order types of the
inverses of) the preferences.
Lemma 13 below relies on the remark that if a player can exclude a lower/downward
interval of least-preferred outcomes, no Nash equilibrium will ever yield such outcomes. So,
the excludable least-preferred outcomes may just be merged into one single worst outcome
of the player, and become the best outcome of the opponent: indeed, this reduction does
not create any Nash equilibrium but yields in many cases a smaller game in terms of
outcomes and especially of preferences, thus enabling a step in the transfinite induction.
Lemma 13 is named after the well-known elimination of dominated strategies (see, e.g.,
[7]), which simplifies a game through its set of strategies only. The two procedures have
nothing much in common, but the naming is meant to suggest that they may complement
each other nicely (although not in this article).
Lemma 13 (Elimination of dominated outcomes) Let g = 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v, {<1
, <2}〉 be a two-player game in normal form with strict linear preferences. Let e ∈ S1 and
o ∈ O and assume that o <1 v(e, s2) for all s2 ∈ S2. Let g′ := 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O′, v′, {<′1
, <′2}〉, where
• O′ := {x ∈ O | o ≤1 x}
• v′(s) := v(s) if v(s) ∈ O′ and v′(s) := o otherwise.
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• <′1 is the restrictions of <1 to O
′.
• x <′2 y := x 6= o ∧ (x <2 y ∨ y = o).
Then every Nash equilibrium of g′ is also Nash equilibrium of g.
Moreover, if the inverse relations of <1 and <2 are well-orders, the order types of (<
′
1
)−1 and (<′2)
−1 are not greater than those of (<1)
−1 and (<2)
−1 respectively. Furthermore,
if o is not the <1-least element of O, the order type of (<
′
1)
−1 is less than that of (<1)
−1.
Proof Let s be a Nash equilibrium of g′. Since o <1 v(e, s2) by assumption about e,
the outcome v(e, s2) is in O
′−{o} by definition of O′, so o <′1 v
′(e, s2) by definitions of v
′
and <′1. Since v
′(e, s2) ≤′1 v
′(s) by definition of NE and since <′1 is also strict linear, we
have o <′1 v
′(s), so v′(s) ∈ O′ − {o} and v(s) = v′(s) by definitions of O′ and v′.
Now let us prove by contradiction that both players are stable w.r.t. s and g. If
v(s) <1 v(x, s2) for some x ∈ S1, then v(x, s2) ∈ O′ since v(s) ∈ O′ and by definition of
O′, so v′(s) <′1 v
′(x, s2) by definitions of v
′ and <′1, which contradicts s being an NE of g
′.
If v(s) <2 v(s1, y) for some y ∈ S2, then v′(s) = o since v′(s1, y) ≤′2 v
′(s) (by definition of
NE) and by definition of <′2, which is also a contradiction. 
The transfinite-inductive step of the proof of Theorem 15 will be justified by Lemma 13
above; but in cases where no player is able to exclude a non-trivial downward interval of
outcomes, existence of sets A and B will be proved to feed Lemma 14 below, which
will subsequently yield the existence of a set C that contradicts the the determinacy
assumption.
Lemma 14 Let f : N2 → N. The following two propositions are equivalent.
1. There exists a subset of the naturals that intersects each f(n,N) and whose comple-
ment intersects each f(N, n), where f(n,N) := {f(n, k) | k ∈ N}.
2. There exist A and B disjoint subsets of the naturals such that either f(n,N) and A
overlap or f(n,N)\(A∪B) is infinite, and likewise, either f(N, n) and B overlap or
f(N, n)\(A ∪B) is infinite.
The statement is formalised below.
∀f : N2 → N,
∃C ⊆ N,∀n ∈ N, f(n,N) ∩ C 6= ∅ ∧ f(N, n) ∩N\C 6= ∅
m
∃A,B ⊆ N, A ∩B = ∅ ∧ ∀n ∈ N, (f(n,N) ∩A 6= ∅ ∨ |f(n,N)\(A ∪B)| = ℵ0) ∧
(f(N, n) ∩B 6= ∅ ∨ |f(N, n)\(A ∪B)| = ℵ0)
Proof For the top-bottom implication A := C and B := N\C witness the claim. To
prove the bottom-top implication let us define two sequences of subsets of N as follows,
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by mutual induction.
X0 := A
Y0 := B
Xn+1 := Xn ∪ {min(f(n,N)\(Xn ∪ Yn))} if f(n,N) ∩A = ∅, otherwise Xn+1 := Xn
Yn+1 := Yn ∪ {min(f(N, n)\(Xn+1 ∪ Yn))} if f(N, n) ∩B = ∅, otherwise Yn+1 := Yn
The inductive steps above are well-defined by the assumed disjunctions and since the
Xn\A and Yn\B are finite by construction. It is provable by induction on n that Xn and
Yn are disjoint for all n, and so are X :=
⋃∞
n=0Xn and Y :=
⋃∞
n=0 Yn. Now note that that
C := X witnesses the claim since Xn+1 (resp. Yn+1) intersects f(n,N) (resp. f(N, n)) by
construction. 
The proof of Theorem 15 starts with a case distinction on Condition 2. The first case
is exactly Lemma 12; the second case is reduced to Lemma 12; and the third case is proved
by transfinite induction on the preferences: the base step invokes Lemma 12 again and the
inductive step performs a case distinction, invoking Lemma 13 when possible and proving
by Lemma 14 that impossibility would contradict Condition 1. (Note that Theorem 15
proves slightly more than what was promised by Theorem 7.)
Theorem 15 (Equilibrium transfer) Let 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 be a two-player
game in normal form, let R1 ⊆ S1 and R2 ⊆ S2, and let us assume the following:
1. the induced game structure is determined via strategies in R1 and R2.
2. one of the following assertions holds:
• the preferences are acyclic and one player i can enforce a finite ≺i-upward cone.
• the preferences have (uniformly) finite height.
• S1 and S2 are countably many and the inverses of the preferences are well-
founded.
Then the game 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 has a Nash equilibrium in R1 ×R2.
Proof The first case is proved by Lemma 12. For the second case, let n ∈ N bound the
height of both ≺1 and ≺2, and let ρ1 : O → {0, . . . , n − 1} and ρ2 : O → {0, . . . , n − 1}
be corresponding rank functions, that is, x ≺i y implies ρi(x) < ρi(y). Consider the game
〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, {0, . . . , n − 1}2, (ρ1 ◦ v, ρ2 ◦ v), {≺′1,≺
′
2}〉 where (i, j) ≺
′
1 (k, l) iff i < k and
(i, j) ≺′2 (k, l) iff j < l. By Lemma 12 the derived game has a Nash equilibrium in R1×R2,
which happens to be a Nash equilibrium for the original game too, by property of ρi.
As for the third case, it suffices to prove the statement for well-ordered preferences, by
linear extension and preservation of Nash equilibrium by (set-theoretic) inclusion. Without
loss of generality, let us also assume that S1 and S2 are infinite, otherwise let us duplicate
strategies, and that O is countable, otherwise let us replace it with v(S1, S2). Note that if
player i can enforce a subset of outcome (via some strategy in Si), he or she can enforce
it via some strategy in Ri, since the opponent cannot exclude it and by determinacy
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assumption together with Remark 6. Let us define a well-founded binary relation over
pairs of ordinals, as follows: (α, β) ≺ (γ, δ) := (α < γ ∧ β ≤ δ) ∨ (α ≤ γ ∧ β < δ), where
< is the usual well-order over ordinals, and let us proceed with the proof by induction
(w.r.t ≺) on the pairs of order types that correspond to the inverses of the preferences.
If one order type is finite, it suffices to invoke Lemma 12, so let us deal with the case
where both order types are infinite. If one player can exclude two or more of his/her
least-preferred outcomes, Lemma 13 and the induction hypothesis prove the claim, so let
us deal with the case where no player can exclude two or more of his/her least-preferred
outcomes. Let A be the set containing (when they exist) the ≺1-least and second-≺1-least
outcomes, so that A is empty if the order-type for player a is a limit ordinal and A is a
singleton when the order type is a limit ordinal plus one. Since player a cannot exclude
any non-trivial downward interval, every finite set of outcomes that he/she can enforce
must intersect A. Let us define B likewise and invoke the bottom-to-top implication of
Lemma 14 instantiated with, up to bijection, A and B defined above and f := v. It implies
the existence of a subset of the outcomes (C in Lemma 14) that player b cannot enforce
and that player a cannot exclude, which contradicts the determinacy assumption. 
3 Applications of the equilibrium-transfer theorem
Section 3.1 generalises Martin’s Theorem on Borel determinacy, from descriptive set the-
ory, and Section 3.2 generalises two determinacy results from theoretical informatics,
namely positional determinacy of parity games and finite-memory determinacy of Muller
games. Note that in each case the corresponding class of win-lose games is derived from
infinitely many game structures (rather than from a single game structure), as similarly
mentioned in Section 1.3.
3.1 Generalisation of Borel Determinacy
An infinite two-player alternate game consists of two players that play alternately and
infinitely many times. In addition, the same non-empty set of choices C is available at
each stage, so the first player picks an element in C, then the second player picks an
element in C, then the first player picks an element in C again, and so on. The underlying
structure of such a game is a leafless and uniform rooted tree. Moreover, each infinite
sequence of choices is mapped to some outcome and both players have preferences over
the outcomes.
Definition 16 (Infinite two-player alternate games and strategies) An infinite 2-
player alternate game is an object 〈C,O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 complying with the following:
• C is a non-empty set (of choices).
• O is a non-empty set (of possible outcomes of the game).
• v : Cω → O (uses outcomes to value the infinite sequences of choice).
• ≺1 and ≺2 are binary relations over O (called the preferences of player 1 and 2,
respectively).
13
A function of type C2∗ → C (resp. C2∗+1 → C) is a strategy for player 1 (resp. 2).
A strategy of a player tells what he/she would play at each node of the game. Since
the tree has a uniform structure, it is convenient to represent a strategy of the first (resp.
second) player by a function of type C2∗ → C (resp. C2∗+1 → C), where C2∗ represents
the finite sequences on C of even (resp. odd) length. When both players have chosen
their individual strategies, their combination induces a unique play, i.e. a unique infinite
sequence of choices.
Definition 17 (Induced play) Given a game g = 〈C,W 〉, and s1 : C2∗ → C, and
s2 : C
2∗+1 → C, let us define p(s1, s2) through its prefixes, inductively as below, where p<n
is the prefix of p of length n and the symbol · represents concatenation.
• p(s1, s2)<2n+1 := p(s1, s2)<2n · s1(p(s1, s2)<2n)
• p(s1, s2)<2n+2 := p(s1, s2)<2n+1 · s2(p(s1, s2)<2n+1)
An infinite two-player alternate game 〈C,O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 may be translated into a game
in normal form 〈{1, 2}, (C2∗ → C)× (C2∗+1 → C), O, v ◦ p, {≺1,≺2}〉, which provides the
infinite two-player alternate game framework with a natural notion of Nash equilibrium.
Before stating Borel determinacy below, let us recall that a subset of a topological space
X is called Borel if it belongs to the smallest collection of subsets of X which contains all
the open sets and is closed under complementation and countable union.
Theorem 18 (Martin [8], [10]) Let C be a non-empty set and v : Cω → {(1, 0), (0, 1)}
be such that v−1{(1, 0)} is a Borel set of Cω (which is endowed with for the product topology
of the discrete topology on C). Then the win-lose game 〈(C2∗ → C)× (C2∗+1 → C), v ◦ p〉
is determined.
The generalisation of Martin’s theorem below is a straightforward corollary of both
Martin’s Theorem itself and the equilibrium transfer theorem.
Corollary 19 Let 〈C,O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 be an infinite 2-player alternate game and assume
the following three conditions.
• O is countable.
• ≺1 and ≺2 have (uniformly) finite height.
• For all o ∈ O, the pre-image v−1{o} is Borel.
Then the game 〈C,O, v, {≺1,≺2}〉 has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof Thanks to the above-mentioned embedding (of alternate games into games in
normal form) and the (uniformly) finite height assumption, it suffices to check Condition 1
from Theorem 15. This is done along Definition 5, so let wl : O → {(1, 0), (0, 1)}. The
set (wl ◦ v)−1{(1, 0)} is Borel since it equals ∪{v−1{o} | v(o) = (1, 0)}, a countable
union of set that are Borel by assumtion. So, by Borel determinacy, the win-lose game
〈(C2∗ → C)× (C2∗+1 → C), w ◦ v ◦ p〉 is determined. 
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3.2 Generalisations on parity games and Muller games
These infinite two-player games are played on graphs. Unfolding these graphs yields infi-
nite trees, so Borel determinacy may imply determinacy for these games. However, Borel
determinacy does not say whether there exist simple winning strategies, or more gener-
ally winning strategies satisfying some predicate. So, the results that are generalised in
Section 3.2 are not mere corollaries of Borel determinacy. The definitions below rephrase,
e.g., [4].
Definition 20 (Arena and strategy) An arena is an object 〈V, V ′, E,C, γ〉 complying
with the following:
• V is a non-empty set of vertexes.
• V ′ ⊆ V are the vertexes owned by player 1.
• E ⊆ V ×V are the edges of a sink-free graph, i.e. ∀x ∈ V, xE := {y ∈ V | xEy} 6= ∅.
• C is a non-empty set of colours.
• γ : V → C assigns a colour to each of the vertexes.
A strategy of player 1 (resp. 2) is a function of (dependent) type V ∗ → ∀v ∈ V ′, vE (resp.
V ∗ → ∀v ∈ V \V ′, vE). A strategy profile is a function of (dependent) type V ∗ → ∀v ∈
V, vE. The combination (s1, s2) of a strategy s1 for players 1 and s2 for player 2 amounts
to a strategy profile, which, when starting from a given vertex, induces a unique infinite
sequence of colours Γ(s1, s2) ∈ CN.
Definition 21 (multi-outcome priority/Muller games) A multi-outcome priority (resp.
Muller) game is an object 〈G, O, r, {≺1,≺2}〉 complying with the following:
• G is an arena where C = N (resp. G a is finite arena) as defined above.
• O is a non empty set of outcomes.
• r : N ∪ {⊥} → O (resp. r : P(C)→ O)
• ≺1 and ≺2 are binary relations over O, the preferences.
For every infinite sequence of colours Γ, let cl(Γ) be its cluster set, i.e. the set of the
colours occurring infinitely often in Γ. The outcome that is induced by a sequence of
colours Γ ∈ CN, i.e. by a strategy profile and a starting vertex, is:
• For Muller games, r ◦ cl(Γ).
• For priority games, r ◦min ◦ cl(Γ) if cl(Γ) 6= ∅, otherwise r(⊥).
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Note that setting O := {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and (0, 1) ≺1 (1, 0) and (1, 0) ≺2 (0, 1) (plus
r(2n) := r(⊥) := (1, 0) and r(2n + 1) := (0, 1) for a multi-outcome priority game) in the
definition above yields a parity (resp. Muller) game, up to isomorphism.
It was proved in [5] that Muller games are determined through finite-memory strategies
and in [4] that parity games with priorities in N are positionally determined. Since these
are determinacy results, let us extend them to multi-outcome settings below. (Note that
one need not know what positional or finite-memory means.)
Corollary 22 Every multi-outcome Muller game (initiated with a starting vertex) with
acyclic preferences has a finite-memory Nash equilibrium.
Proof Let 〈V, V ′, E,C, γ,O, r, {≺1 ,≺2}〉 be a multi-outcome Muller game with acyclic
preferences, and let v0 ∈ V be the starting vertex. Since it is naturally embedded into a
game in normal form (as far as NE are concerned), it suffices to invoke Lemma 12 to prove
the claim, where Conditions 2 and 3 are fulfilled by assumption and finiteness of the game,
respectively. Finally, Condition 1 is also fulfilled: indeed, for every wl : O → {(1, 0), (0, 1)},
the derived win-lose game 〈V, V ′, E,C, γ, wl◦r〉 is a Muller game, so by [5] it is determined
via finite-memory strategies. 
Corollary 23 Every multi-outcome priority game where preferences have finite height
has a positional Nash equilibrium.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 22, up to one point: let wl :
O → {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, the derived win-lose game 〈V, V ′, E,C, γ, wl ◦ r〉 is not obviously
isomorphic to a parity game, because the function wl ◦ r may not map even numbers and
⊥ to (1, 0), and odd numbers to (0, 1). This is easily overcome by renaming the colours:
let γ′(v) := 2 · γ(v) if wl ◦ r ◦ γ(v) = wl ◦ r(⊥) and γ′(v) := 2 · γ(v) + 1 otherwise. By [4]
the parity game 〈V, V ′, E,C, γ′〉 is determined, and so is 〈V, V ′, E,C, γ, wl ◦ r〉. 
Note that, in the area of graph games for program verification, [15] has already in-
vestigated extensions of determinacy in various directions, namely for subgame perfect
equilibrium (a stronger notion of Nash equilibrium), for n-player games instead of two-
player games, or for payoff functions in {0, 1}n instead of {(0, 1), (1, 0)}. For instance,
Theorem 4.19. in [15] states that any initialised two-player parity game has a positional
subgame perfect equilibrium and Theorem 4.20. states that any initialised finite multi-
player parity game has a finite-state subgame perfect equilibrium.
4 Limitations of transfer possibilities
Section 4.1 below suggests that the order and set-theoretic assumptions of Theorem 15 are
tight, although the case where exactly one strategy set is countable and the preferences
are well-founded yet with chains of arbitrary length is still open; Section 4.2 afterwards
suggests that the two-player assumptions of Theorem 15 is tight, although there is still
room for a three-player version of the equilibrium-transfer theorem since I failed to find a
counterexample in the most general case.
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4.1 Order and set-theoretic limitations
Proposition 24 below shows that the countability condition of Theorem 15 is difficult to
weaken in general.
Proposition 24 There exists a game satisfying the following:
• player 1 has countably many strategies,
• the preference of player 1 has no infinite ascending chain,
• the preference of player 2 has one maximum and the other outcomes are minimal,
• the underlying game structure is determined,
• the game has no Nash equilibrium.
Proof Let I (resp. C) be the infinite (resp. cofinite) subsets of the naturals. Consider
the two-player game structure 〈{1, 2}, (C ∪ {α, β}) × (I ∪ {α, β}),N ∪ {a, b}, v〉 where the
unions are disjoints and where v is as below and min refers to the usual order over N.
v : (C ∪ {α, β}) × (I ∪ {α, β}) → N ∪ {a, b}
(X,Y ) 7→ a if X = Y ∈ {α, β}
b if {X} ∪ {Y } = {α, β}
min(X) if (X,Y ) ∈ C × {α, β}
min(Y ) if (X,Y ) ∈ {α, β} × I
min(X ∩ Y − {minX ∩ Y }) if X,Y /∈ {α, β}
Let us first show the determinacy of the game structure. Let P ⊆ N ∪ {a, b}. If P ∩N
is cofinite, player 1 can enforce it (by playing it) since v(X,Y ) is in X for all X ∈ C and
Y ∈ I ∪ {α, β}, by definition of v; so a fortiori player 1 can enforce P . If P ∩ N is not
cofinite, N\P is infinite, so player 2 can enforce it, and a fortiori (N ∪ {a, b})\P .
Second, let us define some preferences: for all x ∈ N ∪ {a}, set x ≺2 b. Set b ≺1 a
and n + k + 1 ≺1 n ≺1 a for all n, k ∈ N. Let us now show that the game has no Nash
equilibrium.
• v(α,α) <2 v(α, β) and v(β, β) <2 v(β, α).
• v(α, β) <1 v(β, β) and v(β, α) <1 v(α,α).
• If X ∈ C and Y ∈ {α, β} then v(X,Y ) <1 v(Y, Y ) = a.
• If X ∈ {α, β} and Y ∈ I then v(X,Y ) <2 v(X,X ′) = b, where {X,X ′} = {α, β}.
• IfX,Y /∈ {α, β} then v(X,Y ) <1 v(α, Y ) sincemin(X∩Y −{minX∩Y }) < min(Y ).

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Note that replacing ”player 1 has countably many strategies” with ”player 2 has count-
ably many strategies” in Proposition 24 yields a correct statement. In the proof, indeed,
it suffices to swap the sets I and C in the definition of the witness game.
Proposition 25 below shows that the (uniform) finite height condition of Theorem 15
is difficult to weaken in general. The proof idea is similar to that of Proposition 24, albeit
slightly more complex.
Proposition 25 There exists a game satisfying the following:
• the preference of player 1 has no infinite chain,
• the preference of player 2 has one maximum and the other outcomes are minimal,
• the underlying game structure is determined,
• the game has no Nash equilibrium.
Proof For every n ∈ N let An := {k ∈ N | n2 ≤ k < (n + 1)2}, and let I := {X ⊆ N |
∀n ∈ N,∃m ∈ N, n ≤ |X ∩ Am|}, and let C := {X ⊆ N | ∃n ∈ N,∀m ∈ N, |Am\X| ≤ n}.
Consider the two-player game structure that is defined by its outcome function below,
where S1 := C ∪ {α0, α1, . . . } and S2 := I ∪ {α0, α1, . . . }, where the unions are disjoints,
and where min refers to the usual order over N. .
v : S1 × S2 → N ∪ {a, b}
(X,Y ) 7→ a if X = Y = αn
b if (X,Y ) = (αi, αj) with i 6= j
min(X) if X ∈ C and Y = αn
min(Y ∩ {n2, n2 + 1, . . . }) if X = αn and Y ∈ I
min(X ∩ Y ∩An − {minX ∩ Y ∩An}) if (X,Y ) ∈ C × I, where
n := min{k | 2 ≤ |X ∩ Y ∩Ak|}
Note that in the last line of the definition above, {k | 2 ≤ |X ∩ Y ∩Ak|} is non-empty
by definition of C and I.
Let us first show the determinacy of the game structure. Let P ⊆ N ∪ {a, b}. If P ∩N
is in C, player 1 can enforce it (by playing it) since v(X,Y ) is in X for all X ∈ C and
Y ∈ I ∪ {α0, α1, . . . }, by definition of v; so a fortiori player 1 can enforce P . If P ∩ N is
not in C, N\P is in I, by definition of C and I, so player 2 can enforce it, and a fortiori
(N ∪ {a, b})\P .
Second, let us define some preferences: set x ≺2 b for all x ∈ N ∪ {a}; set x ≺1 a for
all x ∈ N ∪ {b} and i ≺1 j whenever n2 ≤ j < i < (n+ 1)2 for i, j, n ∈ N. The game thus
defined has no Nash equilibrium, as shown below.
• v(αn, αn) <2 v(αn, αn+1) and v(αi, αj) <1 v(αj , αj) for i 6= j.
• If X ∈ C and Y = αn then v(X,Y ) <1 v(Y, Y ) = a.
• If X = αn and Y ∈ I then v(X,Y ) <2 v(X,αn+1) = b.
• If (X,Y ) ∈ C× I then v(X,Y ) <1 v(αn, Y ), where n := min{k | 2 ≤ |X ∩Y ∩Ak|}.

18
4.2 Three-player limitations
The equilibrium-transfer theorem considers two-player games only, which raises the issue
of the existence of a three-player version of the theorem. However, the condition of ap-
plication of such a version can no longer state a mere determinacy of the game structure,
because the very notion of determinacy makes little sense for three players. Instead, the
condition may require that some specific games that are derived from and are simpler than
the original game all have Nash equilibria. (Note that in the two-player case, the determi-
nacy of the game structure falls into this type of condition.) The counter-examples in this
section suggest that there is no general three-player version, without giving a definitive
answer, though.
Theorem 15 can be rephrased as follows: if equipping a given two-player game struc-
ture with simple preferences (i.e. free of three-outcome chains) always yields a game with
a Nash equilibrium, so does equipping the same structure with more complex preferences.
The example below shows that one cannot just replace ”two-player” with ”three-player”
in the above statement, since preferences with three-outcome chains may already be prob-
lematic.
Remark 26 Let a, b and c be three players, let l and r be two strategies available to each
player, let x, y and z be three possible outcomes, let us define three transitive preferences
by z <a y <a x and x <b y <b z and <c:=<b, and define an outcome function as
follows: v(l, l, l) := v(l, r, l) := v(r, r, l) := y and v(r, l, l) := v(l, l, r) := v(l, r, r) := z and
v(r, l, r) := v(r, r, r) := x. See the graphical representation below, where players a, b, and
c choosing l yields top rows, left columns, and left array, respectively.
y y
z y
z z
x x
• The game 〈{a, b, c}, ({l, r})d∈{a,b,c} , {x, y, z}, v, (<d)d∈{a,b,c}〉 has no Nash equilibrium.
• Let {0, 1}3 be an alternative set of outcomes, for i, j, k, n ∈ {0, 1} let (0, i, j) ≺a
(1, k, n) and (i, 0, j) ≺b (k, 1, n) and (i, j, 0) ≺c (k, n, 1). Then for all wl : {x, y, z} →
{0, 1}3 the game
〈{a, b, c}, ({l, r})d∈{a,b,c} , {0, 1}
3, wl ◦ v, (≺d)d∈{a,b,c}〉 has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof The original game has no Nash equilibrium, by construction. Let wl : {x, y, z} →
{0, 1}3 and from now on let us consider the modified game only, assume that it has
no Nash equilibrium, and draw a contradiction. Both players a and b are stable w.r.t.
the strategy profile (l, r, l) since v(l, l, l) = v(l, r, l) = v(r, r, l) = y by construction, so
wl(y) = wl◦v(l, r, l) ≺c wl◦v(l, r, r) = wl(z). So player c is stable w.r.t. the strategy profile
(l, r, r), and so is player b since v(l, l, r) = v(l, r, r) = z, therefore wl(z) = wl ◦ v(l, r, r) ≺a
wl ◦ v(r, r, r) = wl(x). So player a is stable w.r.t. the strategy profile (r, r, r), and so is
player b since v(r, l, r) = v(r, r, r) = x, so wl(x) = wl ◦ v(r, r, r) ≺c wl ◦ v(r, r, l) = wl(y).
Therefore wl(x) ≺c wl(y) ≺c wl(z), contradiction since ≺c has no three-outcome chain.
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A weaker three-player version of Theorem 15 might obtain by using a large-enough
natural number n as follows: ”if equipping a given three-player game structure with pref-
erences free of (n + 1)-outcome chains always yields a game with a Nash equilibrium, so
does equipping the same structure with more complex preferences.” Proposition 27 below
shows that preferences with (n + 1)-outcome chains may already be problematic. (Note
that the case n = 2 corresponds to Remark 26.)
Proposition 27 For every natural 2 ≤ n there exists a finite three-player game in normal
form that complies with the following:
• The preferences are linear orders over {0, 1, . . . , n}.
• The game has no Nash equilibrium.
• Replacing the preferences with preferences that have no chain of length n+ 1 yields
a game with a Nash equilibrium.
Proof Let 2 ≤ n be a natural, let <b and <c be the restrictions of the usual order over
the naturals to {0, . . . , n}, and let <a:=<
−1
b , that is, n <a n− 1 <a · · · <a 1 <a 0. Let us
define the outcome function v : {1, . . . , n}3 → {0, . . . , n} below.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n let v(n, i, n) := 0.
• For 1 ≤ i < n let v(i, i, n) := i+ 1.
• Otherwise let v(·, ·, n) return n.
• For 1 ≤ i < n let v(n, 1, i) := n.
• For 1 < i < n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n let v(i, j, i) := v(j, i, i) := i.
• Otherwise let v return 1.
For example, the game 〈{a, b, c}, ({1, 2, 3, 4})d∈{a,b,c} , {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, v, (<d )d∈{a,b,c}〉 is
represented below, where player a chooses the row, b the column, and c the array.
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1
1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 1
4 2 1 1
1 1 3 1
1 1 3 1
3 3 3 3
4 1 3 1
2 4 4 4
4 3 4 4
4 4 4 4
0 0 0 0
Let us show that the game 〈{a, b, c}, ({1, . . . , n})d∈{a,b,c}, {0, . . . , n}, v, (<d)d∈{a,b,c}〉
witnesses the claim. First, the preferences are linear orders indeed. Second, let us show
that there is no Nash equilibrium by case-splitting below.
• If i, k 6= n, then v(i, j, k) <c v(i, j, n).
• If i 6= n, then v(i, j, n) <a 0 = v(n, j, n).
• v(n, j, n) = 0 <c v(n, j, 1).
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• v(n, 1, 1) = n ≺a 1 = v(1, 1, 1) and if j 6= 1, then v(n, j, 1) = 1 ≺b n = v(n, 1, 1).
• If j 6= 1 and 1 < k < n, then v(n, j, k) <b n = v(n, 1, k).
• If 1 < k < n, then v(n, 1, k) = n <a 1 = v(1, 1, k).
Third, by contraposition, let ≺a, ≺b and ≺c be arbitrary acyclic preferences, assume
that the game
〈{a, b, c}, ({1, . . . , n})d∈{a,b,c}, {0, . . . , n}, v, (≺d)d∈{a,b,c}〉 has no Nash equilibrium, and let
us prove that ≺c=<c, thus contradicting the assumption on the chains. If i 6= n, by
construction v(i, i, i) = i = v(j, i, i) = v(i, j, i) and v(i, i, j) ∈ {1, i, i + 1}. By assumption
there is no Nash equilibrium and the preferences are acyclic, so i ≺c 1 or i ≺c i + 1 if
1 ≤ i < n, so 1 ≺c 2, and it is provable by induction that i ≺c i+1 for all 1 ≤ i < n. Now it
suffices to prove 0 ≺c 1 to conclude. By assumption the strategy profile (n−1, n, n) is not a
Nash equilibrium, so v(n−1, n, n) = n ≺a 0 = v(n, n, n) since v(i, n, n) = v(n−1, j, n) = n
for i 6= n, since v(n − 1, n, k) ∈ {1, n − 1, n}, and by assumption of acyclic preferences.
Now, the profile (n, n, n) is not a Nash equilibrium either. Since v(n, j, n) = 0, since
v(i, n, n) = n if i 6= n, and since n ≺a 0, the players a and b are sable. Since v(n, n, k) ∈
{0, 1}, we must have v(n, n, n) = 0 ≺c 1. 
Note that in the statement of Proposition 27, one may also modify the games without
Nash equilibrium so that they are zero-sum, by defining z(n) := (−2n, n, n) and using the
outcome function z ◦ v instead of v.
Let us now try to find an alternative equilibrium-transfer theorem that still states
existence of Nash equilibrium in three-player game. As a lead, notice that many two-
player game structures may be derived from a given three-player game structure: first,
by slicing the game cuboid, i.e. by fixing the strategy of one player; second, by merging
any two players into a super player. We may hope that if all thus-derived two-player
game structures are determined (and therefore also have Nash equilibria for more complex
preferences), then the original three-player game structure has a Nash equilibrium when
equipped with simple preferences. However, Proposition 28 contradicts it.
Proposition 28 There exists a finite game structure G = 〈{a, b, c}, Sa, Sb, Sc, {X,Y,Z}, v〉
that satisfies the following:
• for all sc ∈ Sc the game structure 〈{a, b}, Sa, Sb, {X,Y,Z}, v(·, ·, sc)〉, which is ob-
tained by slicing G along sc, is determined. (And similarly by slicing along some
sa ∈ Sa or sb ∈ Sb.)
• the game structure 〈{a × b, c}, Sa × Sb, Sc, {X,Y,Z}, v
′)〉, where v′((sa, sb), sc) :=
v(sa, sb, sc), which is obtained by merging players a and b, is determined. (And
similarly by merging c with a or b.)
• instantiating G with X := (1, 0, 0), Y := (0, 1, 0), and Z := (0, 0, 1) yields a game
without Nash equilibrium.
Proof Let us define a three-player game structure, each player having six strategies.
Informally, the 6×6×6 empty cube is filled with three 3×3×6 cylinders and two 3×3×3
cylinders. The cross section of each of these cylinders looks like this:
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X Y Z
Y Z X
Z X Y
Let us define the outcome function of the game formally below, where each of the five
blocks of three lines corresponds to a cylinder.
v(1, 1, ·) := v(2, 3, ·) := v(3, 2, ·) := X v(·, 4, 1) := v(·, 5, 3) := v(·, 6, 2) := X
v(1, 2, ·) := v(2, 1, ·) := v(3, 3, ·) := Y v(·, 4, 2) := v(·, 5, 1) := v(·, 6, 3) := Y
v(1, 3, ·) := v(2, 2, ·) := v(3, 1, ·) := Z v(·, 4, 3) := v(·, 5, 2) := v(·, 6, 1) := Z
v(4, ·, 4) := v(5, ·, 6) := v(6, ·, 5) := X
v(4, ·, 5) := v(5, ·, 4) := v(6, ·, 6) := Y
v(4, ·, 6) := v(5, ·, 5) := v(6, ·, 4) := Z
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, set the following:
v(4, 1, i) := v(5, 3, i) := v(6, 2, i) := X v(4, i, 4) := v(5, i, 6) := v(6, i, 5) := X
v(4, 2, i) := v(5, 1, i) := v(6, 3, i) := Y v(4, i, 5) := v(5, i, 4) := v(6, i, 6) := Y
v(4, 3, i) := v(5, 2, i) := v(6, 1, i) := Z v(4, i, 6) := v(5, i, 5) := v(6, i, 4) := Z
A typical section of the whole game structure, actually v(·, ·, 1), looks as below: the
cross sections of two cylinders on the left-hand side, the ”outer face” of another cylinder
on the right-hand side:
X Y Z X Y Z
Y Z X X Y Z
Z X Y X Y Z
X Y Z X Y Z
Y Z X X Y Z
Z X Y X Y Z
Instantiating the game structure with X := (1, 0, 0), Y := (0, 1, 0), and Z := (0, 0, 1)
yields a game without Nash equilibrium, because none of the cylinders constituting the
whole game has a Nash equilibrium.
Nonetheless, all the two-player game structures that are derived from the three-player
game structure by slicing or merging have a Nash equilibrium, as partially justified below.
Slicing: fix the strategy of c between 1 and 3 (resp. 4 and 6), then player b (resp. a)
can choose the outcome he/she wants. For instance fixing the strategy of c to 1 yields the
game represented graphically above. Similar situations arise when fixing strategies of a or
b.
Merging: The three 3 × 3 × 6 cylinders ensure that any two players can collectively
enforce any outcome. 
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The next and last idea is to combine the two previous attempts to get even stronger
assumptions: given a game structure, we may hope that if slicing or merging it always
yields determined game structures, and if equipping it with simple preferences always yields
games with Nash equilibrium, then so does equipping it with more complex preferences.
However, the following does not sound very promising.
Proposition 29 There exists a finite game structure G = 〈{a, b, c}, Sa, Sb, Sc, {X,Y,Z}, v〉
that satisfies the following:
• for all sc ∈ Sc the game structure 〈{a, b}, Sa, Sb, {X,Y,Z}, v(·, ·, sc)〉, which is ob-
tained by slicing G along sc, is determined. (And similarly by slicing along some
sa ∈ Sa or sb ∈ Sb.)
• the game structure 〈{a × b, c}, Sa × Sb, Sc, {X,Y,Z}, v
′)〉, where v′((sa, sb), sc) :=
v(sa, sb, sc), which is obtained by merging players a and b, is determined. (And
similarly by merging c with a or b.)
• Equipping G with preferences that are free of three-outcome chains yields a game a
Nash equilibrium.
• Equipping G with Z <a Y <a X and X <b Z <b Y and Y <c X <c Z yields a game
without Nash equilibrium.
Proof Let us define a three-player game structure that is not as symmetric as the one
from Proposition 28: Player a has four strategies and players b and c have seven strategies
each. Informally, the 4 × 7 × 7 empty cuboid is filled with one 4 × 3 × 3 cylinder like in
Proposition 28, four thinner 2× 2× 7 cylinders, and four shorter versions of these, namely
2× 2× 3 cylinders. The different sections of the thinner cylinders look like these:
X Y
Y X
X Z
Z X
Y Z
Z Y
Let us define the outcome function of the game formally below, where each of the five
blocks of three lines corresponds to a cylinder.
v(·, 5, 1) := v(·, 6, 3) := v(·, 7, 2) := X
v(·, 5, 2) := v(·, 6, 1) := v(·, 7, 3) := Y
v(·, 5, 3) := v(·, 6, 2) := v(·, 7, 1) := Z
v(1, 1, ·) := v(2, 2, ·) := v(1, 3, ·) := v(2, 4, ·) := X
v(1, 2, ·) := v(2, 1, ·) := Y
v(1, 4, ·) := v(2, 3, ·) := Z
v(3, ·, 5) := v(4, ·, 4) := X
v(3, ·, 7) := v(4, ·, 6) := Y
v(3, ·, 4) := v(4, ·, 5) := v(3, ·, 6) := v(4, ·, 7) := Z
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, set the following:
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v(3, 1, i) := v(4, 2, i) := v(3, 3, i) := v(4, 4, i) := X
v(3, 2, i) := v(4, 1, i) := Y
v(3, 4, i) := v(4, 3, i) := Z
v(1, i + 4, 5) := v(2, i + 4, 4) := X
v(1, i + 4, 7) := v(2, i + 4, 6) := Y
v(1, i + 4, 4) := v(2, i + 4, 5) := v(1, i + 4, 6) := v(2, i + 4, 7) := Z
Typical cross sections of the whole game structure look like the two below, v(·, ·, 1) on
the left-hand side and v(·, ·, 7) on the right-hand side.
X Y X Z X Y Z
Y X Z X X Y Z
X Y X Z X Y Z
Y X Z X X Y Z
X Y X Z Y Y Y
Y X Z X Z Z Z
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Equipping the game structure with the preferences Z <a Y <a X and X,Z <b Y and
X,Y <c Z yields a game without Nash equilibrium.
Nonetheless, slicing the game structure or merging any two of its players yields a
determined game structure. It is proved either by similar arguments as in Proposition 28,
or as follows to show that the cross section v(·, ·, 7) above to the right is determined: if Y
or Z makes player a win, player a wins for sure by playing one of the last two rows; if Y
and Z make player a lose, player b wins for sure by playing the last column.
Let us now show that equipping the game structure with preferences that are free
of three-outcome chains yields a game with a Nash equilibrium: If two players share a
preferred outcome, they can collectively enforce it, which yields a Nash equilibrium, so
now let us assume that the three players prefer distinct outcomes. The following array
points to one Nash equilibrium for each of the six permutations of (X,Y,Z) as preferred
outcomes:
a b c Nash equilibrium
Z X Y 1, 1, 1
Z Y X 1, 2, 1
Y X Z 1, 3, 1
Y Z X 1, 4, 1
X Y Z 4, 7, 7
X Z Y 4, 7, 6

Proposition 29 does not fully dash the hope for a three-player version of the equilibrium-
transfer theorem, though. Indeed, an alternative, even weaker statement could be as
follows for a given natural number n: ”If merging or slicing a given three-player game
always yields determined structures, and if replacing the preferences of the game with
preferences of height at most n always yields games with a Nash equilibrium, then the
original game also has a Nash equilibrium.” The case n = 2 is disproved by Proposition 29,
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but the cases 3 ≤ n are still open. If there are counterexamples too, building them and
proving their combinatorial property might be rather complex, though.
5 Conclusion
This article has shown that every determinacy result over a given two-player game struc-
ture is transferable into existence of multi-outcome Nash equilibrium over the same game
structure. Moreover, when the outcomes are finitely many, the proof provides an algo-
rithm that computes a Nash equilibrium without significant complexity loss compare to
the win-lose case.
Contrary to most game-theoretic results, which state that every game of a given class
of games has some property, this result is a higher-order theorem: it states that every
class of games that is derived from any game structure has itself some property.
If the heights of the preferences of the two players are finite, the equilibrium transfer
holds regardless of the game structure; furthermore, if the structure has countably many
strategies, the finite-height condition can be relaxed and phrased as absence of infinite
ascending sequences, which was the hardest to prove in this article.
Although counterexamples from Section 4.1 show that these conditions are useful,
there is still room for fine-tuning. In particular, it is still open whether the following is a
sufficient condition for equilibrium transfer: ”the strategy set of one player is countable
and the preferences of the players have no infinite sequences (even descending)”.
Section 3 gave three examples of applications of the equilibrium-transfer theorem.
Apart from the generalisation of positional determinacy of parity games, which is new,
the two other obtained results are weaker than existing results; but the key point here is,
however, that the three applications are almost effortless, and that the same would hold
for further applications.
The two above-mentioned existing generalisations of Borel determinacy and finite-
memory determinacy of Muller games are indeed more general than what can be obtained
by application of the equilibrium-transfer theorem, because they hold in a multi-player
setting. The proofs are ad hoc, though, which raises the question of a uniform equilibrium-
transfer theorem for games with three or more players. A natural attempt is to replace the
determinacy condition with existence of Nash equilibrium in some simpler derived games.
Counterexamples in Section 4.2 disproved some simple variants of such an attempt, but
existence of a slightly more complex variant is still an open question. Alternatively, one
may try to add strong conditions on the structure, e.g., after noticing that the players
play sequentially in both Muller games and the games used for Borel determinacy.
Unexpectedly, the finite-height condition of Theorem 15 leads to an interesting general
phenomenon about preferences in game theory: contrary to a widespread belief, linear
orders do not account for partial orders. Indeed the remark below considers two finite-
height preferences, therefore fulfilling Condition 2 of Theorem 15, yet for all possible linear
extensions of these preferences, equilibrium transfer does not hold!
Remark 30 Let ≺1 and ≺2 be two binary relations over N that are defined by 2n ≺1
2n+1 and ≺2:=≺
−1
1
. For all <1 and <2 linear extensions of ≺1 and ≺2 respectively, there
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exists a game satisfying Condition 1 of Theorem 15, but without Nash equilibrium.
Proof If the inverse of <1 is not a well-order, the game 〈{1},N,N, id, {<1}〉 has no
Nash equilibrium although the induced structure is determined, so let us assume that the
inverse of <1 is a well-order. Since the sequence (2n)n∈N has no <1-increasing subsequence,
it has a <1-decreasing subsequence (2φ(n))n∈N (as a consequence of Ramsey Theorem).
Setting a := 2φ(0) + 1 and b := 2φ(0) and xn = 2φ(n + 1) embeds the preferences from
Proposition 24 into <1 and <2, respectively, so the witness game from Proposition 24 also
witnesses the remark at hand. 
Nonetheless, it is often very convenient to consider linearly ordered preferences only,
when actually done without loss of generality. Remark 30 above just exemplifies that one
ought to be very cautious because a loss of generality may actually occur.
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